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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of Local Action Groups (LAGs) and of their 
organizational and operational dynamics as subjects for research 
undoubtedly transcends the status generally attributed to these bodies in 
public debate. In reality, they have remained in the background as 
institutional actors. 
If Local Action Groups have taken a back seat hitherto as institutional 
actors, an analysis of their experience provides valuable material on which 
to make assessments, for at least two reasons: 
a. firstly, in the history of LAGs — as concerning the way they have 
interpreted the promotion of rural development — it is possible to discern 
the dynamics (as well as the problems) of the relationship between 
sectoral actions and essentially territorial actions; in other words between 
actions conducted in the interests of agricultural development and actions 
classifiable under the heading of rural development. This is one of the 
issues most widely discussed by interdisciplinary literature, relating to 
rural development; 
b. secondly, and more especially, the analysis of LAGs and their 
history sheds light on the perspectives and limits associated with the new 
modes of overseeing social processes referred to generally as governance: 
activities that in point of fact have found one of their most profitable areas 
of experimentation in the sphere of rural development policies. 
A sizeable body of literature has been generated on the question of 
governance over local and rural development. Most of this material is 
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“regulatory” in character: it establishes, so to speak, a doctrine of 
governance that tends to formulate the concept of the mechanism under 
the pretence of describing it. Some of this research material — probably 
the smaller part, but nonetheless a very important one — gives a picture of 
governance processes that differs, sometimes not inconsiderably, from 
what might be regarded as the mainstream notion of governance. Every 
time one looks, not at the abstract potentialities of governance processes, 
but at their actual performance, there emerges a disparity between 
objectives and outcomes. 
If interest in the governance of development processes does not decline 
— but tends rather to persist despite numerous indications of failure — 
this is due probably to the attitude described by Bob Jessop (2006) as 
“public romantic irony”, a kind of wishful thinking that persuades actors 
to carry on as if success were possible, even while being forced to 
acknowledge the probabilities that the attempt at governance would 
ultimately fail. 
We feel that this is the right spirit in which to approach a study of Local 
Action Groups: to construct a realistic and detached assessment, although 
on the philosophically and politically constructive supposition that 
through an analysis of the limits presented by the tools of governance, one 
can find the power to overcome them. 
In this paper we will endeavour, on the theoretical plane, to construct a 
reference grid for the analysis of experiences in the governance of rural 
development (an empirical analysis using this same grid is presented, in 
this publication, by Angelo Belliggiano). 
In the next section, following e brief look at the history of the LAG as an 
instrument of governance, we identify certain theoretical indicators useful 
in defining the “ideal” placement of the LAG in a perspective of 
governance applied to rural development. In section 3, we suggest a 
theoretical grid for the analysis of failure — or failures — discernible in 
the experience of LAGs when their actual performance is compared with 
the objectives officially assigned to them. 
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2. Elements for a theory on Local Action Groups 
 
The history of LAGs is connected by two strands with changes in 
European agricultural policies. It was at the end of the 1980s that the 
European Commission decided on a gradual move away from existing 
agricultural policy based on a “top down” approach, driven by projects 
and sectors, in favour — at least nominally — of a “bottom up” approach, 
definable as endogenous and integrated. With the Future of Rural Society 
(1988), then later, the Cork Declaration (1996) and the working document 
Rural Developments (1997), attention turned progressively toward the 
territorial dimension and the adoption of an approach focusing on the 
promotion of an endogenous, sustainable and participatory form of 
development. 
The general view in existing literature (Sotte, 2006) is that the second 
half of the 20th century witnessed an evolutionary transition from a model 
of “agrarian rurality” to a model of “industrial rurality”, and ultimately to 
a model (incomplete, or indeed incipient, as yet) of “post-industrial 
rurality”. The third model would emerge, from the 1990s onward, 
following a change in the “social mandate” of rural areas, which were 
required — not least on the basis of the possibilities inherent in physical 
and virtual movement afforded by new transport and communications 
technologies — to provide a setting for residential settlements as well as 
for leisure activities, characterized by the demand for intangible assets 
such as sustainability, quality of life, typicality, authenticity, originality, 
peculiarity; in short, by the bond with rural territory. This confirmed the 
idea of a multifunctional role for agriculture (Basile and Cecchi, 2001), 
likewise the ideas of a short value chain and the offer of intangible 
utilities. 
The notion of rural development understood as a product of “territorial 
rebalancing” was replaced gradually by the perspective of endogenous 
development, based on the creation of value prompted and managed by 
local actors. On the policy level, this perspective prefigures the shift from 
sectoral actions to promotion of the territory. And in response to this 
demand for diversity and difference, one has the search for a new way of 
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distributing responsibilities, hence a reorganization of the dynamics of 
governance and decision-making as regards the choice of strategies for 
planning and investment, or in practice, valorization. 
This process of transformation — definable in essence as the transition 
to a “post-industrial”, or more accurately, a “post-productivist” model of 
rurality (Marsden et al, 1993; Ploeg and Renting, 2000) — cannot be 
interpreted simply, as is often the case, in terms of a “natural” outcome 
produced by evolutionary changes in the ideas and practices of 
development. It is not simply the fruit of a process whereby previous 
approaches found to be unsatisfactory are “superseded”. Conversely, it is 
a transformation that responds seemingly to a threefold set of 
requirements and interests. 
Firstly, it represents a picture of “post-materialist” needs (Inglehart, 
1977) formulated first by the “aesthetic criticism” (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 1999) of capitalist modernization, and thereafter through the 
spread of an environmentalist culture and awareness. 
Secondly, it configures as a process of readjustment in the area of 
capitalist exploitation strategies, the tendency of which is to shift the 
centre point of profit generation from the inside to the outside of the 
enterprise, placing value on the actual objects of that renewed picture of 
needs. With the decline in the strictly industrial dimension of enterprises, 
it is the territory that is now being interpreted — as acknowledged by 
business economists — in terms of “a deposit of vitality for enterprise”10. If 
the search for positive externalities — based on the local development 
approach — is the key to the success of enterprises with their roots in the 
territorial dimension, then so-called promotion of the territory appears to 
be the extreme consequence of this search. 
Thirdly, but no less importantly, it reflects the trend toward a 
construction of Europe as a space for competition between territories: it is 
the social actors who operate in the (rural) milieu who must keep 
themselves in a state of continual mobilization with a view to self-
maintenance of their economic well-being; and it is each territory that 
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must identify and maximize the value of its “own” resources in a scenario 
of global competition. 
Against this backdrop, one can discern the genesis of the institutes of 
governance applied to rural development: a genesis straddling the stage of 
“industrial rurality” and that of “post-productivist rurality”. 
From the early 1990s, the European Leader Approach provided the 
centre of gravity for the experimentation of a new approach to the 
governance of relations between social processes and institutional system: 
an experimentation, that is to say, of devices able in abstract terms to 
generate a “possible coming together of institutional policies and social 
practices” (Magnaghi, 2000, p. 114). Local Action Groups — entrusted 
with the management of this Community Approach at territorial (sub-
provincial) level — were intended to be a linch pin for governance 
processes radically renewed from the standpoint of bottom-up 
development pathways, on the assumption that there was no existing 
standard development model, applicable to any given rural situation. 
Like the LAGs, the Local Action Plans (LAPs) — i.e. the planning tools 
drawn up by the action groups (and vetted at Community level) in 
defining the development programme to be implemented — respond 
principally to requirements for integration and intersectorality. The 
essential characteristic of these tools is that they bring together local actors 
with the end in view of pursuing a common goal, namely to maximize 
value for the benefit of the rural territory they represent. 
Naturally, to the same extent that cases can be made in general for 
doctrines and approaches of local development, the notion of rural 
development does not in any sense offer a radical alternative to the 
imperatives inherent in capitalist exploitation of resources. Rather, it 
expresses a conception of development as competition on a global scale, a 
continuous process of “competing with everyone from everywhere for 
everything” (Sirkin et al, 2008). In other words, this not a change in the 
basic rules of the free market game, but a transformation of the ways that 
competition is viewed and enacted: the idea of rural development begins 
with the premise that competition cannot be played out on the basis of an 
absolute, univocal and predetermined rationality, i.e. assuming there is 
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“one best way” for development. In reality, the broadest possible cognitive 
awareness must be encouraged, to promote constant learning of new 
resources and new modes of valorization. Consequently, the 
interdependencies between non-business social actors, business actors and 
institutional actors must not be managed by way of tools, such as 
hierarchy, that reduce their complexity, but employing devices that allow 
this same complexity to be interpreted as a resource. 
An enormous body of literature on governance has highlighted several 
different, and not necessarily alternative aspects. At all events, it seems 
hard to dispute that governance should be considered a “post-modern” 
(and probably post-democratic) method of controlling the economy, which 
calls on local structures to perform tasks of “lubricating” business 
dynamics in a scenario characterized by the reduction of direct action in 
the economy on the part of the State (Jessop, 2006). 
Leaving aside the political and economic principles on which the tools 
of governance are based, our purpose here will be to understand the 
operating logic of these tools when applied to rural development, drawing 
a comparison between their “reference models” and the ways in which 
they meet typically with total or partial failure. 
The dynamics and failures of governance devices are best understood, 
in our estimation, through concepts and topicalizations offered by the 
domain of organizational theory and sociology. The reconstruction of 
modalities typifying the failure of governance will be looked at in the next 
section; here we consider the elements that are attributed “positively” to 
the tools of governance. Beyond all the possible definitions of governance 
— a term at once signifying “theoretical concept, political paradigm, and 
regulatory requirement” (ibid. p. 190) — we can reasonably affirm that: 
1) to define the mechanism of coordinating the interdependencies that 
governance expresses, or presumes to express, reference can be made to 
the concept of heterarchy; 
2) the organizational model that best expresses the forms of 
coordination applicable to the mutual interdependencies that governance 
enables, or presumes to enable, is that of the network. Accordingly, we feel 
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that a theory of LAGs should focus primarily on these two fundamental 
aspects. 
1. Heterarchy. The clear expression of a regulatory approach founded on 
governance, Local Action Groups are based in principle on an interaction 
of heterarchical nature, or, on reflexive self-organization. This is a model 
for the coordination of interdependencies (Stark, 2009) which, likewise in 
principle, differs distinctly both from market-related coordination, and 
from government-related coordination. Whereas these two mechanisms 
are based on exercising a certain type of rationality (economic rationality 
in the former instance, political in the latter), heterarchical coordination 
assumes that the field will be open to bearers of different rationalities and 
demands which, whether under a market regime or a government regime, 
would appear to be incompatible and incommensurable. 
Heterarchy, in short, represents a form of control over complexity that 
is based on rejecting any unilateral reduction of complexity: a method of 
coordination that leverages the possibility of continuous learning and 
consequently trusts in the willingness of actors to exercise reflexiveness. 
Self-evidently, this is a principle of regulation definable as procedural 
in nature, abstractly qualified to build a negotiated consensus for 
concerted action, with the involvement of actors bringing different 
perspectives. 
It is precisely on the basis of these suppositions that the institution of 
LAGs was intended initially to come about. In effect, the process presents 
itself as the institutionalization of negotiations, or the dynamics of 
learning and of mediation, designed to generate consensus around 
acquisitions pooled in common or indeed developed in common. In this 
light, clearly, LAGs provide a tool with the capacity to identify the 
optimum level of governance for local development, and to do so flexibly, 
since they can be “modelled” to complement each specific territorial 
configuration. On paper, then, LAGs would appear to be highly effective 
in overcoming the constraints imposed by political and administrative 
systems. In addition, and likewise in principle, LAGs would be able both 
to leverage private sector resources, and to integrate territorial strategies 
with sectoral strategies. 
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2. Network. As observed by Stark (2009), there are, at one and the same 
time, two fundamental aspects to heterarchical organization: the first 
concerns a substantive and procedural principle — referred to above — 
namely the absence of a system whereby standards of evaluation are 
ordered hierarchically. The second concerns a principle of strictly 
organizational character: the “natural” form of organization for heterarchy 
is that of the network. 
In the last twenty years, sociological literature has reflected a growing 
awareness that there are mechanisms of coordination other than the 
market-driven model, and other than the hierarchical, vertical model. 
Powell (1990) was, and continues to be, an essential work of reference 
from this standpoint. In the years since, it has been argued with increasing 
clarity that “tertiary” approaches to coordination are not simply hybrid 
forms of the first two — which tends to be the argument of economic neo-
institutionalism (Williamson, 1985) — but rather, forms of networked 
coordination that are patently different both from market-driven 
relationships, given their “occasional” nature, and from hierarchical 
relationships, in which there is necessarily a legitimate authority at work 
(Podolny and Page, 1998). 
Even if studies on local development have given plenty of space to 
notions formulated “at the boundaries” between economic theory and 
sociological analysis — first and foremost that of social capital (with 
reference in particular to rural development: see Pagan, 2009) — the 
organizational dimension has long “…all things considered, been little 
understood by commentators on local development” (Pichierri, 2002). 
Recently, there have been various attempts at organic reconstruction of 
the possible uses for concepts of organizational sociology in the analysis of 
development processes. In a paper by Piras and Salivotti (2012), for 
example, the concept of networking — as explored in organizational 
sociology — is discussed in the study of governance applied to 
development. 
From the standpoint of abstraction, at least, the configuration of LAGs 
is correlated to an idea of networked coordination, in other words to the 
creation and management of symmetrical, not hierarchical relationships. 
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From a “de facto” status — a network of knowledge, skills, bodies and 
levels of decision-making that operates, at all events, in the dynamics of 
socio-economic change — one has a transition, in essence, to a “de jure” 
status, and the institutionalization of networked coordination. 
 
 
3. Elements for a theory on the failure of Local Action Groups 
 
If, as intimated, the last twenty years have seen the emergence and 
refinement of the idea that there are forms of governance over 
interdependencies qualifying as neither market-related nor hierarchical, the 
most recent decade of sociological literature has also raised awareness that 
the dynamics of governance and the networked organizational systems to 
which they relate, far from being conceived as the solution to failures of 
the State and of the market, are themselves subject to frequent and 
manifest failures. 
As Bob Jessop warns, “the growing attractiveness of such governance 
mechanisms should not lead us to overlook the risks involved in 
substituting it for exchange and command and to ignore the likelihood of 
governance failure. [...] For it is not just markets and imperative 
coordination that fail; governance is also prone to failure, albeit for 
different reasons, in different ways, and with different effects” (Jessop, 
2006, pp. 198-199). 
In effect, there are countless reports and analyses in literature of cases 
where forms of networked, and primarily heterarchical coordination, have 
failed either totally or in part. A paper by Andrew Schrank and Josh 
Whitford (2011) suggests the idea of constructing what might be termed a 
“general theory” for the failure of networks, such as would explain the 
reasons why networks perish (or fail to materialize), and in other cases, 
why networks continue to be kept in place despite their poor performance. 
The taxonomy of failures proposed by the two U.S. sociologists 
distinguishes between absolute failures and relative failures (ibid. p. 153). 
The former are occasioned by (i) the collapse of already existing 
relationships, definable as dissolution of the network, or (ii) potentially 
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productive or profitable networks failing to materialize, which are 
definable as being stillborn. In the case of relative failures, the authors 
distinguish between (iii) involution of the network, where permanent 
failure is caused by lack of competencies, and (iv) contested collaboration, 
resulting from excessive opportunism. 
Whilst the cases cited by Schrank and Whitford are many and varied — 
and perhaps fully appropriate in explaining the fortunes of networks 
populated by private sector actors, operating in an organizational milieu 
seen as the sphere of competition between businesses — they appear 
nonetheless to ignore other impediments to the performance of networks, 
produced when the nature of the actors involved, and therefore the nature 
of the negotiations, is wider in scope. The governance of development 
processes has connotations, at least in principle, decidedly more complex 
than those of the network configurations scrutinized by Schrank and 
Whitford. 
Other studies, such as that of Jessop (2006), offer additional scope for 
analysis precisely because they relate expressly to processes of governance 
in which business actors are involved together with non-business social 
actors and political/institutional actors. According to Jessop, there are at 
least four large categories of problems that can prove to be 
insurmountable even for a well-designed governance structure:  
1. First and foremost, governance is impotent in the face of radically 
complex administrative needs. In other words, the Lancaster University 
sociologist suggests that too much is expected of governance; and that 
governance is accused of inadequacies which, in reality, reflect the weight 
of contradictions that governance can never resolve. 
2. Secondly, there may be problems connected with the possibility of 
actual learning, when faced with elements that are especially subject to 
change, or placed within an overly turbulent environment. 
3. Thirdly, there may be problems related to representation. Those 
who are involved in processes of communication and negotiation — the 
very substance of governance — are not stakeholders with a direct interest 
in the actions and decisions undertaken, but simply representatives. 
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Consequently, deficiencies of representation become deficiencies of 
governance.  
4. Finally, there is an area of problems connected with formation of 
the subjects of governance and the subjective conditions of coordination. 
This highlights the “struggle to define positions of dominance or 
hegemony within specific spheres of politics or of governance, as well as 
wider social formations” (ibid. p. 201). 
Taken overall, the broad categorizations of Schrank and Whitford, and 
in particular those suggested by Jessop, appear to provide sufficient data 
for what could qualify as a “theory of governance failure”. They afford a 
picture of potential problem areas in which it is possible to place the 
majority of critical elements that have been identified in literature, over 
time, with reference specifically to the governance of rural development. 
Among these, mention can be made, for example, of problems relating to 
conditions dictated by the “context” in which processes of governance are 
required to operate (and, in abstracto, expected to influence); also to the 
“internal” dynamics of the circuit of governance. 
With regard to context, points of interest are: 
a. the conflicting relationship between sectoral policies and rural 
development policies; 
b. more generally, a limited awareness as to the nature of what meets 
the definition ‘rural’ and ‘rurality’ (see Sivini, 2003, pp. 35-39), hence 
the persistence of serious doubts concerning who may or may not be 
the actors in transformation processes; 
c. the asymmetry between places in which the “determining factors” 
of change are located, and the places where governance is exercised; 
d. a lack of decision-making competencies in governance structures, 
which on occasion find themselves restricted to the task of merely 
managing action plans that have already been delineated for the 
most part. The “bottleneck” of competencies has the effect of 
helping to ensure that new forms of mixed public-private sector 
organization tend to operate as tools for gaining access to EU 
funding for community programmes, without managing to put 
forward any appreciably innovative planning ideas. 
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As concerning causes of failure originating from within the structure of 
governance, one can look at: 
e. the emergence, or persistence, of self-promotional attitudes that lead 
to significant asymmetries in the make-up of the network (Timpano, 
2005), ensuring the prominent involvement of actors most strongly 
associated with local power bases (Murdoch, 2000); 
f. the convergence of parties on decisions that do not meet criteria of 
efficiency and effectiveness, but tend to satisfy a lowest common 
denominator of actors’ demands, thereby allowing consensus to gel 
(Piras and Salivotti, 2012); 
g. an insufficient level of participation in decision-making processes. In 
the EU White Paper on governance, participation is a key word, if 
not the vital concept. And yet, the poor level of actual participation 
is an extremely widespread reality. 
The article by Angelo Belliggiano reconstructs a number of critical 
profiles reflecting the experience of one of the LAGs operating in the 
Apulia region. What emerges from the research is a collection of problems 
that vary in nature, but can probably be better understood when applying 
the theoretical framework delineated in the foregoing pages. 
